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A Crisis Beyond Law, or a Crisis of Law?
Reflections on the European Economic Crisis
loannis Glinavos*
Abstract
This paper attempts to locate the place of law in debates on the economic crisis. It
suggests that law is the meeting point of politics and economics, not simply the
background to market operations. It is suggested therefore that the law should be
seen as the conduit of the popular will through political decision making onto eco-
nomic systems and processes. The paper argues that the crisis can be seen as being
the consequence of the dis-embedding of the political from the economic, and it is
this distance that causes legal frameworks to operate in unsatisfactory ways. With
this theoretical basis, the paper examines the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The
European debt crisis in general and the plight of Greece in particular show why
plasticity in policy making is necessary and also reveal why current orthodox solu-
tions to economic calamities fail. The inflexibility of the neoclassical understanding
of the state-market relationship does not allow for avenues out of crisis that are
both theoretically coherent and politically welcome. Such realisations form the
basis of the examination of the rules framing the Eurozone. This paper, after con-
ducting an investigation of exit points from the Eurozone, condemns the current
institutional framework of the EU, and especially the EMU as inflexible and inade-
quate to deal with the stress being placed on Europe by the crisis.
Keywords: Eurozone, economic crisis, Greece, debt, Grexit.
A Introduction
Since 2008, the world in general and Europe in particular has existed in a state of
continuous crisis. From the collapse of Lehman Brothers, to the credit crunch, to
single, double, and triple dip recessions, from collapses in production, trade and
consumer confidence to the sovereign debt crisis and austerity, it seems like we
have lived through six years of unending bad news. Reflections on the role of law
in the midst of this multifaceted crisis have ranged from viewing law as the
source of the problem to envisaging law as a solution. Perhaps, some even argue,
this crisis is post-law; it demonstrates the irrelevance of regulatory frameworks
and legal rules in the era of global financialised capitalism. This paper seeks to
explore the role of law in the crisis, envisaging law as occupying the space where
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economics and politics meet. Law in this regard (the paper hypothesises) is both
the source of the problem and a tool for its eventual resolution. In attempting
this reflection, the paper begins by examining the relationship between law, eco-
nomics, and politics, utilising the Polanyian notion of economic orders dis-
embedded from their social and political backgrounds. It continues by examining
more closely an important instance of market disequilibrium, the sovereign debt
crisis. This examination (with Greece as a focal point) allows us to test the notion
that legal frameworks are to blame for what Laskos and Tsakalotos' term 'a lack
of plasticity' in European policy making. Does law restrict policy and are current
European institutional structures unable to provide a solution? Testing the feasi-
bility of solutions to the European debt problem necessitates an evaluation of the
legal possibility of the infamous 'Grexit'. The paper concludes by asking whether
law reform can provide an exit from the crisis, or does the lack of institutional
flexibility in Europe make 'Drachmageddon' inevitable?
B Law, Economics, and Politics: Seeking Balance
Karl Polanyi2 made a distinction between embedded and dis-embedded economic
orders that has become axiomatic in analyses of political economy since. Polanyi
argued that embedded economic orders were inextricably linked to and insepara-
ble from their social environment; dis-embedded orders, on the other hand, were
a creation of the 19th century and were based on the idea of an independent, uni-
versal, market-based, economic rationality.3 The financial crisis has reinforced
the notion that a financial capitalism disconnected from the real economy and
the interests of society is a dangerous and unsustainable development. Alongside
this realisation, there is a growing perception that the 'technocracy' that has been
a response to the crisis in many states leads to a progressively less-democratic
capitalism which is unsustainable. The cornerstone of technocratic, supposedly
apolitical policy making rests on the suggestion that de-politicised economic deci-
sion making ensures long-term stability and has been critically reinforced by the
financial crisis. However, such a move to cement the dis-embeddedness of the
economic from the political creates both unmanageable discontent and is self-
defeating. Responses to the crisis have been dominated by the desire to erect legal
barriers that separate the popular will from economic decision making. The last
six years have been dominated by efforts to do the 'right' things (from a neoclas-
sical economic perspective) while keeping at bay the 'populist' forces of resist-
ance. While we can debate the extent to which the law caused the problem (by its
presence, or most likely through its absence), we can agree that the law is much
present as part of the solution, but in unanticipated ways. Law is there not in
efforts to re-regulate or control markets but in establishing firewalls between pol-
itics and economics. It is surprising that a crisis that shares so much with the
1 C. Laskos & E. Tsakalotos, Crucible of Resistance: Greece, the Eurozone and the World Economic Cri-
sis, Pluto Press 2013.
2 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press 1957.
3 I. Glinavos, Neoliberalism and the Law in Post Communist Transition, Routledge 2010.
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Great Depression ended up in causing further desegregation of the economic
from the political (with law as the tool), in total opposition to the movement for
greater social embeddedness of market processes that was the response in the
1930s. This is not a development to be content with.
Market-advocates, even more than market-sceptics, stand to gain from the
realisation that a growing disconnect between public support and free markets,
embedded in legal structures, does more to undermine markets than state-
sponsored attempts at re-regulation. We can no longer pretend that economic
policy is a technical matter when the results of austerity and 'orthodox' thinking
are social collapse in the south of Europe. The reason why the debate about better
economic management and more legitimate economic decision making is essen-
tially a political question is because it is only political processes that can deter-
mine the overall aims of policy with a degree of legitimacy and permanence that
ensures the long-term survival of the capitalist project.4 Economic policy design
cannot be considered an issue of technical competence, a scientific endeavour. We
are told that the market has rules that are akin to scientific rules and that these
rules demand certain things of the state-market relationship and set frameworks
that mandate what is beneficial and what is damaging to the market and by
extension the society as a whole. Market needs are in accord with social needs,
subject to this view. When social needs diverge from what is best for the market,
however, the currently dominant analytical framework described above requires
that social requirements take a back seat to the needs of the market. Determining
a hierarchy of needs and goals for government policy however cannot be made
the prerogative of so-called scientific economic analyses. It is only politics which
can determine the aims of a system of governance, not markets or economic theo-
ries. Any democratic society aspiring to live in a state governed by law should see
such law determined in reflection of the popular will. A society governed by laws
created on the basis of their compatibility with 'technical competence' are inching
away from democracy, towards what we could, in the context of contemporary
capitalism, call a 'dictatorship of finance'. Is such a state an acceptable solution to
Europe's problems? Latin America experienced authoritarian impositions of neo-
liberal projects based on 'technical expertise' in the past with catastrophic social
and economic consequences. Is such a model one we want to emulate in 21st-
century Europe?
A modern European democratic state pre-supposes a balance of interests
between markets and states, between economics and politics. But in discussing
where the balance should be between markets and states and what the role of law
is within such a balance, we need to address the question of what capitalism aims
to achieve. Indeed, we may need to ask the question of what the market aims to
achieve. We need, in other words, to find what the goals of policy should be
before we start debating the technical means employed to reach those goals.
Asking such questions suggests a radical break with the current policy of leaving
economic policy issues to the 'experts'. Of course, there is a place for technical
4 I. Glinavos, Redefining the Market-State Relationship: Responses to the Financial Crisis and the Future
of Regulation, Routledge 2013.
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expertise in law making but only after we answer the question of what capitalism
is for and what the role of markets is. Only then can we use economic efficiency
arguments to determine the means to achieve these objectives. Economic consid-
erations, whether or not in the guise of science, should not determine every aim
of policy. As I stressed in Redefining the Market-State Relationship, it is our prerog-
ative as citizens to determine what the market is for, what the state should do,
and the shape and structure of our economies. The acceptance of free markets as
an effective way to achieve optimal outcomes should not mean that the public is
robbed of choices. Citizens ought to have a choice about fundamental questions
as to how we live our lives, choices extending far beyond the selection of goods
and services. Citizens should have a choice as to the aims of the economic system
and as to the outer legal boundaries of that system. The financial crisis allows us
to revisit the capitalist settlement of financialisation, of the domination of finan-
cial services over the global economy, and the tool to implement a change, to find
a new balance, is the law.
I A Case Study in Disequilibrium: The Sovereign Debt Crisis
The debt crisis that has plagued Europe since 2010, placing question marks over
the survival of the Eurozone and the European Union as a whole, is an excellent
example of the role of law in dis-engaging markets from their social surroundings.
Further, the debt crisis brings to the fore the propensity of market-friendly
reforms, and the legal structures they are based on, to restrict policy options
when they are most needed. In seeking to show the consequences institutional
design can have on the political economy of a country and of the continent (in the
case of Europe), the paper proceeds to present a short history of the sovereign
debt crisis in Europe, especially in Greece, where the effects of dis-embeddedness
have been most acute.
One may wonder indeed why the crisis moved from being the spawn of finan-
cial markets to a crisis in the real economy and subsequently to a crisis of state
indebtedness. Why has this transmission from finance to high-street to sovereign
bond markets taken place considering what one would presume to be a sophisti-
cated understanding policy makers (internationally) had of the features of eco-
nomic crises and their consequences? Why did not Ben Bernanke, the former
Chairman of the American Federal Reserve, who is a scholar of the Great Depres-
sion see this coming and do something to avert it? One answer for inactivity or
the ineptitude of political classes on both sides of the Atlantic is provided by Paul
Krugman.5 He suggests that policy makers know that Keynesian expansionary
policies are needed in recessions to boost demand and rebalance the economy,
but their hands are tied by fear of market reprisals. Governments have in fact
demonstrated this knowledge historically by acting decisively when markets fell
into crises. A recent example is the expansionary policies pursued during the first
stage of the global crisis from 2007 to 2010. However, why have they failed to act
since 2011? One could argue that the IMF and the European institutions have
made things worse, arguing in favour of pro-cyclical fiscal policies when theory
5 P. Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics, Penguin 2008.
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and practice both demonstrate that their effect is to deepen recessions.6 Europe-
ans (especially the Germans) have insisted on contractionary policies and fiscal
consolidation in Greece, Italy, Spain, everywhere in the Eurozone in fact, despite
the fact that it is demonstrated daily that such pro-cyclicality is locking the south
of Europe into a debt spiral.
Krugman's answer is that policy choices nowadays are motivated by fear of
the market. It is what we could call a 'market confidence' game that restrains
political choices and prevents demand-side economic proscriptions to pave a way
out of crises.7 Assuming this is true, one has to enquire why markets demand
recessionary policies ignoring the fact that they are bad for the economy. The
answer is that there is no direct correlation between policies bad for economic
development and loss of profits for investors, who, depending on their position
within the market, stand to gain from a variety of indicator movements. The han-
dling of the current crisis, despite its ineptitude, had certain investors win both
when states propped up their banking sectors to keep them from collapse and
when subsequently states tried to radically reduce their (recently exploded) debt
burden. Policy makers therefore find themselves in the peculiar situation of doing
the 'wrong' thing to appease a market that wins all the time. Of course, one
should not underestimate the ideological sclerosis that leads to insistence on con-
tractionary fiscal policies. The neoliberal obsession with a minimal state necessi-
tates austerity and contraction, even when the economic results are (to say the
least) disappointing. The UK is a good example of this trend. Nonetheless, we
have to concede that markets cannot play a dominant role in the way in which a
political economy functions, unless allowed to do so by whoever yields power and
possesses authority.8 It is important therefore to determine first who has power
and second to assess where they get this power from. Strange has argued' that
whoever can gain the confidence of others in their ability to create credit will con-
trol the economy. The scale of economic activity nowadays (in advanced capital-
ism) is such that accumulation of wealth (on a traditional Marxist analysis) is not
enough to power the system. What does power the system is the capacity to
attract credit and to accumulate debt.
One of the great paradoxes of our times is the expectation that international
outcomes are borne of national policies. This by-product of globalisation handi-
caps governments who are on the one hand expected to react to international
market imperatives but can only influence directly national policies. This is why,
for example, reform proposals of a liberal trajectory are meant to be national in
origin but international in effect, determining a country's comparative advan-
tages over the rest of the world.' 0 Strange's assessment of finance as a national
and simultaneously global phenomenon offers support to the explanation above.
For Strange,"1 the financial structure has two inseparable aspects: it comprises of
6 Glinavos 2013, p. 96.
7 Ibid.
8 S. Strange, States and Markets, 2nd edn, London, Pinter Publishers 1994, p. 23
9 Ibid., p. 30.
10 Glinavos 2013, p. 97.
11 Strange 1994, p. 90.
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political economy structures through which credit is created and of the monetary
system that determines the relative values of moneys in which credit is denomi-
nated. The first power is generated by the dynamic between states and banks, the
second between states and markets. A financial structure therefore is the sum of
all the arrangements governing the availability of credit plus all the factors deter-
mining the terms on which currencies are exchanged. It is through these inter-
connected mechanisms that crisis can spread from one aspect of economic activ-
ity to the others, like the infamous contagion that poisons sovereign debt mar-
kets in Europe.
Greece presents an obvious case study of both legally imposed restrictions on
policy making and a good example of the effect market pressures can have on
policy discretion. Both these elements help explain the lack of plasticity in Greek
policy making, and also offer an opening to the institutional make-up of the
Eurozone, which explains the lack of original thinking on the part of European
institutions. The Greek problem erupted after the national election in 2009 and
the revision of official figures, showing the deficit at 12.7% of GDP in 2009, while
the national debt, according to the government's own estimates, amounted in
January 2010 to 125% of GDP. This promptly became a process of rapidly
increasing spreads between Greek and German bond yields. Faced with the legal
restrictions on sovereignty imposed by the framework of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), when presented with a loss of confidence in the markets
Greece had very little room for manoeuvre. The only way a country can deal with
a market crisis or a loss of competitiveness, without devaluing its currency, is by
producing more efficiently, or by producing more cheaply. As efficiencies are diffi-
cult to achieve and time-consuming to implement, Greece has been pressured by
its partners in the Eurozone to 'reform' its economy via cost savings. This means
that Greece has to reduce wage spending, which inevitably means that it has to
lower the population's standard of living. Such internal devaluation, it was hoped,
would allow Greece to retain or to regain some of its lost comparative advantages
and mimic the effects of currency devaluation, which of course was not an option
within the Eurozone.12
The terms of the first Greek bailout in 2010 were exactly aimed to achieve
such an internal devaluation. As was predictable, and indeed predicted, the
'assistance' offered by the Troika of EU, IMF, ECB did not improve Greece's fiscal
position, both because the enforced retrenchment deepened the recession and
because the measures required were beyond the willingness and the capacity of
the Greek political establishment to implement. Greek society was equally unwill-
ing to accept austerity and who can blame them? In the words of Keynes: "There
has never been in modern or ancient history a community that has been prepared
to accept without intense struggle a reduction in the general level of money
income".1
The result was that Greece needed another bailout. The second bailout was
indeed agreed at the end of 2011, but this time it also required the participation
12 Glinavos 2013, p. 99.
13 J. Keynes, Collected Writings, Vol. 20, Activities 1929-1931, London, Macmillan 1981, p. 64.
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of the private sector in an effort to reduce Greece's unsustainable level of debt.
After this deal went through with a lot of fanfare, the realisation dawned that the
reduction in the debt burden achieved was nowhere near enough to bring the
debt-to-GDP ratio close to the 120% level the IMF considers the threshold for
affordability. Data for 2011 showed Greek debt at 170.6% of GDP even though
Greece reduced its deficit to 9.4% from 10.7% in 2010 and 15.6% in 2009.14
Faced with the prospect of the IMF withdrawing from the Greek rescue plans, the
Europeans agreed on November 2012 yet another deal to cut Greece's debt by
E40bn, projecting a drop in debt to 124% of GDP by 2020 (involving cuts in the
interest rate on official loans, extending their maturity by 15 years to 30 years,
and granting Athens a 10-year interest repayment deferral).'5 The continuing
deteriorating outlook for Greece (debt reached 175% in 201416), even after the
alleged achievement of a primary budget surplus in 2013, continues to fuel talk of
an IMF withdrawal.' 7
The Greek problem and its handling demonstrate the propensity of market-
friendly legal frameworks to reduce policy discretion when it is most needed. At
times of crisis, policy makers have the difficult task to address economic calami-
ties while continuing to carry popular consent and to act for the benefit of their
citizens. Institutional structures that prioritise the interests of investors, how-
ever, or proclaim the superiority of market mechanisms in the distribution of
benefits and costs of economic activities, create the risk that policy making
becomes disconnected from the popular will. Such disconnection is not an
abstract evil; it carries a very real risk of the disintegration of the body-politic and
threatens the survival of democracy and the maintenance of peace.' 8 An investi-
gation of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe therefore assists in explaining how
constitutionalising market superiority (elevating economic governance beyond
the reach of normal political process further dis-embedding economic structures
from their sociopolitical basis) risks everything, including the survival of the mar-
ket itself. The next section explores further this notion of institutional deficiency
by looking into the make-up of the Eurozone and how the attempt to create eter-
nal institutions serves to de-legitimise the European project, plus undercut
efforts to deal with the crisis.
C The Need for Plasticity in Policy Making
A key problem in addressing the financial and sovereign debt crisis has been
Europe's institutional capacity (or incapacity) to respond to shocks. As mentioned
14 Reuters Euro Zone Cut Fiscal Deficit in 2011, debt up (22.10.2012) <www.reuters.com/article/
2012/10/22/us-eurozone-debt-idUSBRE89LOB120121022> (last accessed 17.3.13).
15 Glinavos 2013, p. 101.
16 Ernst & Young Eurozone Forecast - Greece (September 2014) <www.ey.com/Publication/vwLU
Assets/EY-Eurozone-Sep-2014-Greece/$FILE/EY-Eurozone-Sep-2014-Greece.pdf> (last accessed
21.11.14)
17 M. Stevis, 'IMF and Europe Part Ways Over Bailouts', The Wall Street Journal, 11 October 2013,
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304500404579127521104414230>.
18 Glinavos 2013, p. 102.
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earlier, this has been described as a lack of plasticity in policy making, a phenom-
enon that this paper blames on a problematic understanding of the role of law in
balancing economics and politics. The concern is that if legal structures lack flexi-
bility, they are unable to soften the blows dealt by crises. An incapacity to deal
with unpredictable and rapidly changing situations comes from the construction
of legal frameworks on the basis of market-friendly requirements demanding less
flexibility for policy makers. This constitutionalisation of pro-market economic
decision making may render policy making more predictable for market partici-
pants but makes legal frameworks and policy responses inflexible. When stress is
applied, as for example by the European sovereign debt crisis, these inflexible
structures risk breaking under intense political pressures. Politics inevitably can
be constrained by legal frameworks only for certain periods of time and under
certain circumstances; their resilience reaches its limits when the disconnect
between economic decision making and democratic choice becomes too wide.' 9 In
Greece, this break point will manifest as soon as a new election is called, where
pro-austerity parties are expected to be defeated. A core provision ensuring pre-
dictability of decision making in market outcomes is the notion of the irreversi-
bility of the monetary union. It is to this central plank of European policy that we
now turn in an attempt to unveil the restrictive nature of legal arrangements in
the Eurozone threatening with ever deepening crises.
The underlying hypothesis of the following discussion is that the legal frame-
work bringing together the European Union and the Eurozone is deficient in that
it fails to be flexible enough to accommodate policy changes required to deal with
significant shocks. A central example is the capacity of Member States to leave
the EU as a whole, or the Eurozone in particular. A related issue is the ability of
the EU, or the Eurozone, to expel members that are no longer considered able to
remain within the groups. The nature of the European project as a forward-only
moving locomotive is to blame for the lack of flexibility.20 As mentioned above, it
is argued here that institutional and legal inadequacies do not prevent situations
from occurring, but lacking the tools to deal with them tend to make things
worse. As the old axiom goes, there are no dead-ends in politics. The problem is
however that solutions outside the legal framework and institutional arrange-
ments, even if politically negotiated, risk further deconstruction of the European
project. It is for this reason that the institutional framework should accommo-
date the possibility of both a multi-speed Europe and of withdrawal from the vari-
ous spheres of integration. It is suggested that institutional frameworks should
allow space for democratic politics to determine the future for each political
entity. A re-engagement of economics with politics in a Polanyian movement
needs a different type of law than the one currently supporting European institu-
tional structures.
The obvious place to begin a discussion of departures from the process of
European unification is Greece. The year 2012 was replete with talk about a
possible 'Grexit' (a term beloved of the press, denoting a Greek exit from the
19 Ibid., p. 1 0 3 .
20 Ibid.
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Eurozone). The alleged achievement of a primary budget surplus in 2013 and a
positive trade balance (after significant rebalancing of imports and exports) is
likely to revitalise a debate as to Euro-membership in Greece in 2014. Rather than
showing progress through continued Euro-membership, the two facts mentioned
above (budget and trade surplus) make the case for unilateral default and euro-
exit even more compelling. It is against this background that a discussion needs
to be had concerning both the possibility of a unilateral exit from the Eurozone,
and possible expulsion. It has often been argued that Treaty provisions for with-
drawal from the EU would be incompatible with the nature of the Union, which
involves the intention of the Member States to work towards an 'ever closer
union'. The position as to withdrawal from the Union has altered after the pass-
ing of the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force on 1 December 2009. Article 50
of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly makes provision for the voluntary secession of a
Member State from the EU. Specifically, the exit clause provides that a Member
State wishing to withdraw from the EU must inform the European Council of its
intention; the Council is to produce guidelines on the basis of which a withdrawal
agreement is to be negotiated with that Member State; and the Council, acting by
a qualified majority and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament,
will conclude the agreement on behalf of the EU. The withdrawing Member State
would cease to be bound by the treaties either from the date provided for in the
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after notification of its intention
to withdraw.
On the basis of the above, it appears that the right to withdraw from the
Union introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is a genuinely unilateral right. The right to
withdraw is not for instance preconditioned on adoption of a constitutional
change that a Member State cannot accept but exists independently.
Athanassiou 21 stresses that it is not the element of negotiation that would make a
Member State's withdrawal consensual (as opposed to unilateral) but the absence
of restrictions on a Member State's right to withdraw. This is perhaps because the
exit clause represents the recognition of a political reality as a sovereign Member
State cannot be coerced into honouring commitments it no longer has an interest
in. However, and this is crucial for the purposes of our discussion in relation to
the sovereign debt crisis, the exit clause in the Lisbon Treaty contains no special
provisions on the requirements for the withdrawal of a Member State which has
adopted the Euro. The possibility of a Grexit presupposes the possibility that a
state part of the EMU would be able to leave the Eurozone while remaining in the
EU.
One interpretation of the Lisbon withdrawal right is that withdrawal from
EMU without a parallel withdrawal from the EU would be legally inconceivable.
Unlike EU participation, EMU participation is a legal obligation for all its Member
States from the point of entry onwards. While a Member State may be free to
denounce its EU participation and repudiate its treaty obligations in their
entirety, it would not be free to go back on its decision to join EMU without
21 P. Athanassiou, 'Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections', Legal
Working Paper Series, No. 10, ECB December 2009, p. 24.
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breaching a binding obligation, under the EC Treaty, unless it were also to with-
draw from the EU. Consequently, it seems that the only way to withdraw from
EMU is to withdraw from the EU using Article 50 of the Treaty and then try to
rejoin the EU but asking not to re-enter into the monetary union." The alterna-
tive would of course be to negotiate an EMU exit with other the Member States,
but this is not realistic considering the long negotiations it would entail and the
need for ratification by all Member States to any treaty amendment. Perhaps as a
matter of urgency, a unanimous agreement by the European Council leading to
the issue of a European regulation could be sufficient despite the legal uncer-
tainty that this could entail." The problem with this solution however is not so
much theoretical but practical. In the current political and international environ-
ment, a speedy decision by all Member States to any EU-wide change, especially
one allowing one of the Eurozone members to leave, is difficult to conceive.
Indeed, it could be argued that a genuinely unilateral right of withdrawal
would be unthinkable in the context of EMU due to the incompatibility with the
language of EU Treaty provisions and Protocol 24 on the Transition to the Third
Stage of Monetary Union. It is difficult to envisage an agreement to withdraw
against the references in the legal instruments to the 'irrevocability' of the substi-
tution by the Euro of the currencies of the participating Member States and to
the 'irreversibility' of the monetary union process." Perhaps an exit from EMU
was never properly theorised because of the complex network of rights and obli-
gations that EMU entails for its participating Member States and their central
banks, which cannot easily (never mind automatically) be resolved through a
withdrawal. We are left with the result therefore that only an agreed exit from the
Euro area is possible, yet practically extremely unlikely for reasons already
mentioned. EMU is a sub-set of the EU, which is why the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank - lying at the heart of
the ESCB and the Eurosystem - is annexed as a Protocol to the EC Treaty. While
after Lisbon the possibility of unilateral withdrawal from the EU also implicitly
recognises the possibility of unilateral withdrawal from a subset of the EU
(namely EMU), we cannot in conclusion argue that the European institutional
framework can accommodate the secession of a Member State from the
Eurozone. This lends credence to the hypothesis posited earlier that the EU's
institutional structures are inflexible and therefore deficient in the sense that
they limit policy options, even when these options are necessary due to political
or economic realities.
So far we have been discussing the feasibility of exit from the Eurosystem, or
the EU, at the instigation of a Member State battling a severe economic crisis
(Greece) or one that has a change of heart about membership (for example the
UK). There is another aspect of this discussion however. What would be the
22 Glinavos 2013, p. 109.
23 E. Dor, 'Leaving the Euro Zone: A User's Guide', 2011-ECO-06, Working Paper Series, October
2011, IESEG School of Management <http://my.ieseg.fr/bienvenue/DownloadDoc.asp?Fich=
1046781054 2011-ECO-06_Dor.pdf> (last accessed 17.3.13).
24 Athanassiou 2009, p. 24.
European Journal of Law Reform 2014 (16) 4688
A Crisis Beyond Law, or a Crisis of Law?
institutional treatment of a Member State that ceased to cooperate with EU insti-
tutions to a degree that the other members wished to expel it from the Union or
the Eurozone? There is no treaty provision at present for a Member State to be
expelled from the EU or EMU. The closest that Community law comes to recog-
nising a right of expulsion is Article 7(2) and (3) TEU, allowing the Council to
temporarily suspend some of a Member State's rights (including its voting rights
in the Council) for a 'serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the prin-
ciples mentioned in Article 6(1)' of the EU Treaty.25 If a right to expel Member
States from the EU or EMU does not exist, then could such a right be asserted?
Let us consider once more the current case of Greece. If the Greeks were to elect
someone who proves less willing to deal with international lenders and reacts to a
withdrawal of financial support by European institutions by introducing capital
controls and other measures restricting freedom of movement for services, capi-
tal, and people, we would have a situation where a Member State is in breach of
fundamental treaty obligations. We assume in this scenario that the Greek
government seeks to remain in the Eurozone and the EU but does not wish to
cooperate in implementing an austerity plan as a pre-condition to the re-
commencement of assistance, and we also assume that other EU Member States
do not wish to authorise restrictive measures. It is not inconceivable that extreme
measures taken to address a crisis can be accepted by European institutions and
partners. Cyprus for example was allowed to introduce capital controls in Spring
2013 as part of a rescue deal for its banking system. Measures in violation of the
treaties would in such a case be borne out of necessity (dealing with the conse-
quences of bankruptcy) rather than an act directed to provoke expulsion from the
EU. If the EU moved to expel Greece regardless, this would then be done against
the wishes of the Greeks to continue their membership of the EU. If then EU
members (minus Greece) voted for a treaty amendment to expel Greece, they
would fail as such action would necessarily entail an unauthorised treaty amend-
ment in breach of Article 48 TEU. 26
To make matters worse, any attempt to expel a Member State would com-
pound the complexities that arise in relation to a state's voluntary withdrawal
because of the risk of legal challenges by disadvantaged natural persons, legal
entities, or even countries objecting to the loss of the rights that they or their
nationals may have acquired from membership of the EU (one could assert, on
any reading of the treaties, a legitimate expectation of maintaining membership
benefits in perpetuity). Participation in the European Union gives rise to a wide
web of rights and obligations to citizens, companies, and governments. To erase
all those obligations at a stroke by expelling the Member State would create huge
confusion and would penalise ordinary citizens and businesses who rely on their
rights of residence and free movement.2 7 The position in summary is that the
exhaustive list of sanctions provided for in the treaties does not include a right to
25 Athanassiou 2009, p. 32.
26 Glinavos 2013, p. 110.
27 Hansard, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness
Symons of Vernham Dean) 28 April. Ref. 180-428-05, 1998, Column 160.
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withdraw 'in protest' against a fellow Member State's failure to comply with its
treaty obligations; the same is true of expulsion, which is not catered for in the
treaties, however serious or repeated a Member State's non-compliance may be
and however much its departure may be desired by its partners.2 8
The conclusion seems to be rather secure, therefore, that a Member State
cannot be expelled from the EU or the Eurozone. Let us remember however that
while the EU's institutional make-up does not allow for expulsions, EU institu-
tions could make life for an intransigent Member State impossible within the
Union. Consider for example what life would be like for Greece without continued
financial support for its state finances and its banking system. Sovereign insol-
vency within the Eurozone is not a situation that can be maintained, as the suf-
fering inflicted on the population would most likely be deemed unacceptable.
D Conclusion
This paper began by posing the question on where we should place law in debates
about the financial crisis. To a degree, the place of law in contemporary political
economy has been misconceived. Law is either blamed for creating the precondi-
tions for the crisis, due to its absence (lack of regulation, severe de-regulation), or
seen as a technical fix (better or more pervasive regulation post crisis). Law how-
ever is at its core the meeting point of politics and economics and it should be
celebrated as such. Law is not simply the background to market operations but
the conduit of popular will through political decision making onto economic sys-
tems and processes. One way of viewing contemporary capitalism is as an inci-
dence of disequilibrium between the economic and political. Market-based ration-
ality and supposedly scientific 'technical' solutions shape our political economy
and use law as a tool to implement 'orthodox' solutions disregarding political
imperatives. The crisis therefore can be seen as being the consequence of the dis-
embedding of the political from the economic, and it is this distance that causes
legal frameworks to operate in unsatisfactory ways. It is, in other words, the
flawed conceptualisation of regulation and not the actual implementation of
technical rules that lies at the core of the problem. This paper has examined the
sovereign debt crisis in Europe as the prototypical incidence of disequilibrium.
The European debt crisis in general and the plight of Greece in particular show
why plasticity in policy making is necessary and also reveal why current orthodox
solutions to economic calamities fail. The inflexibility of the neoclassical under-
standing of the state-market relationship does not allow for avenues out of crisis
that are both theoretically coherent and politically welcome. Such realisations
form the basis of the examination of the rules framing the Eurozone. This paper
condemns the current institutional framework of the EU, and especially the EMU
as inflexible and inadequate to deal with the stress being placed on Europe by the
crisis.
28 Athanassiou 2009, p. 36.
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The one-size-fits-all structure of the Eurozone and the assumptions of per-
manence of economic and political structures is to blame for the sclerosis of
Europe and its unwillingness or inability to respond to shocks. While, as the
paper notes, the introduction of an EU exit clause by the Lisbon treaty inserts a
degree of flexibility in the European monolith, it is too little to address the core of
the problem that stems from Euro-membership. When the current economic and
legal framework fails, when a political demand becomes prevalent for a change of
direction, an inflexible institutional system can only serve to de-construct the
European project. This paper is not anti-European and not anti-Euro. It is rather
pragmatic in acknowledging that if the people of Europe (or Greece for that mat-
ter) wish no longer to be part of the European project, they will not be con-
strained by institutional arrangements. Would it not be better one wonders, if
policy making had sufficient plasticity to accommodate the popular will, instead
of being determined by preachers of orthodoxy?
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